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The fourteen papers in this collection offer a variety of original contributions to
the epistemology of modality. In seeking to explain how we might account for our
knowledge of possibility and necessity, they raise some novel questions, develop some
unfamiliar theoretical perspectives, and make some intriguing proposals. Collectively,
they advance our understanding of the field.
In Part I of this Introduction, I give some general background about the contem-
porary literature in the area, by sketching a timeline of the main tendencies of the
past twenty-five years or so, up to the present debates. Next, I focus on four features
that largely characterize the latest literature, and the papers in the present collection
in particular: (i) an endorsement of the importance of essentialism; (ii) a shift to a
“metaphysics-first” approach to modal epistemology; (iii) a focus on metaphysical
modality as opposed to other kinds of modality; and (iv) a preference for non-uniform
modal epistemology.
In Part II, I present the individual papers in the volume. These are organized around
the following four chapters, based on their topic:
(1) Skepticism and deflationism
Metaphysical Challenges
1. Justin Clark-Doane—Metaphysical and Absolute Possibility
2. Graham Priest—Metaphysical Necessity: A Skeptical Perspective
Epistemological challenges
3. Jennifer Wang—The Epistemological Challenge to Modal Primitivism
4. Frank Jackson—Deflationism about the Necessary a Posteriori and Twin-
Earth
5. Anand Vaidya and Michael Wallner—The Epistemology of Modality and The
Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction
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(2) Essentialism
6. Antonella Mallozzi—Putting Modal Metaphysics First
7. Boris Kment—Essence and Modal Knowledge
8. Mark Jago—Knowing How Things Might Have Been
9. Bob Hale—Essence and Definition by Abstraction
10. Philip Goff—Essentialist Modal Rationalism
(3) Non-essentialist accounts
11. Francesco Berto—Taming the Runabout Imagination Ticket
12. Stephen Biggs and Jessica Wilson—Abduction vs. Conceiving in Modal
Epistemology
13. Amie Thomasson—How Can We Know Metaphysical Modal Truths?
(4) Applications
14. Gabriel Rabin—Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the
Scrutability Argument Against Physicalism
1 Part I
1.1 The general issue
We often have a strong sense that things might have been different; we might regret
having done something and wish we had made a different choice, or perhaps feel
relieved realizing that we might have just avoided a dangerous or uncomfortable sit-
uation. And that is not just at the individual level. It is natural to think, for example,
that earth might not have been warming and ice might not have been melting in the
last decades, had we humans not acted so recklessly with our fossil fuel emissions.
Likewise in the case of things that are not quite up to us. We all probably agree that
there might have been more zebras than there actually are; that there might not have
been water on earth, so that life would have never developed; or, that a second moon
might have been orbiting around us. For any (contingent!) actual fact we can think of,
it strikes us that a myriad of alternative possibilities could have been actual instead.
On the other hand, we also have an opposite sense that many things could not possibly
have been different. It is widely believed, to mention a couple of familiar examples, that
given that the chemical composition of water is H2O, water could not have had another
molecular constitution. Or that, regardless of whether humans ever used arithmetic,
the arithmetical laws could not have been different.
In addition, modal thinking has widespread practical applications. Reasoning about
what is and is not possible, and evaluating counterfactual scenarios, is crucial to our
everyday life; for example, in making choices and planning future action, in learning
from experience, as well as in interpreting and evaluating other people’s behavior.
Modal thinking is also a key theoretical tool in scientific practice, where assess-
ing possible outcomes, probabilities, and counterfactuals helps researchers formulate
hypotheses and predictions. Even at the socio-political level (as Achille Varzi once
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pointed out to me), our ability to work for a better world may be to an important extent
a function of our ability to imagine and evaluate other possible worlds, that is, other
ways our own world could be.
However simple and straightforward all this may sound, things get extremely com-
plicated when we try to explain modal thinking, its outputs, and their epistemic status.
The main question how do we know about possibility and necessity? branches out in
several more specific directions. What are the distinctive epistemic means and meth-
ods involved in gaining modal knowledge? How do they reliably lead us to form true
beliefs about modality? Which specific constraints must be in place for our beliefs
about modality to be justified? Is such a justification a priori, or empirical? How can
we answer modal skepticism, which challenges us to explain how we can access modal
facts if we lack any perceptual or causal connection with them? How can we ward
off modal error, that is, how can we tell when apparently possible scenarios are not
genuinely possible? Does everyone use the same epistemic means and methods for
forming modal beliefs, and across different contexts, or can they vary?
Focusing on the central issue of how we know about possibility and necessity,1 I will
map out the main tendencies in the literature over the past twenty-five years or so, up
to the present debates, by sketching a tripartite timeline. (Note that the timeline is not
meant to be strictly chronological. As we will see, later thinkers may fit squarely into an
earlier generation; likewise, earlier ones may have anticipated current trends). While
somewhat simplified, this should be a useful tool for navigating the contemporary
debate.
1.2 The first generation—intuition, conceivability, imagination
Historically, within Western thought, intuition, conceivability, and imagination
broadly understood have been the chief candidates for explaining how we know
about possibility and necessity. Think of classical Cartesianism, where the source
of our modal knowledge is a distinctive kind of intellectual grasp. But think also
of Hume’s cognitive psychology, where all our modal beliefs derive from experien-
tially-informed imagination. This tradition has been pursued in contemporary modal
epistemology by a number of authors. Going back about twenty-five years to Yablo’s
1993 seminal paper, what we might call the “first-generation” of studies in contem-
porary (post-Kripkean) modal epistemology aims to explain knowledge of modality
by appealing to our broadly imaginative and intuitive capacities. It is important to
notice that, methodologically, all those theories focus on individuating and giving an
account of the distinctive cognitive/epistemic means and methods involved in modal
knowledge. In doing so, they adopt a “means-first” approach to modal epistemology,
as I call it. This approach has been prominent also throughout the second genera-
tion, until very recently. Going “means-first” in modal epistemology is in effect to
tackle the central question of how we know about modality head-on. First-generation
1 I will mostly speak of knowledge of modality here. However, unless otherwise specified, what I say is
meant to be applicable to more modest epistemological targets, such as justified modal belief or understand-
ing of modality, and to be neutral enough to accommodate internalist as well as externalist epistemological
frameworks.
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thinkers put forward detailed accounts of conceivability, imagination, and intuition,
and of their epistemic powers for gaining modal knowledge. (For an illuminating tax-
onomy of our hypothetical attitudes, see Balcerak Jackson 2016). Main examples of
such first-generation studies include the above-mentioned Yablo 1993; Menzies 1998;
BonJour 1998; Chalmers 2002; Bealer 2002; Gregory 2004; Kung 2010; Ichikawa
and Jarvis 2011; Chudnoff 2013. (See also the papers in the now classic Gendler
and Hawthorne 2002). Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of these modal epistemologists
are also heavily inclined to some form of rationalism, although typically only “mod-
erate”. (Peacocke 1999 deserves a separate mention here. His account differs from
those mentioned above in that it does not rest on any particular notion of conceivabil-
ity, imagination, or intuition. For Peacocke, modal knowledge is instead a matter of
(implicit) knowledge of certain principles of possibility. Still, his work fits squarely
within the first-generation rationalist camp.)
1.3 The second generation—the empiricist counterwave
A second-generation of studies has brought about a forceful empiricist counterwave
in modal epistemology. While still focusing on the distinctive means and meth-
ods involved with modal knowledge, thus maintaining a means-first approach, those
authors introduce the idea that we gain modal knowledge empirically. Most second-
generation thinkers share a wider research agenda that frames modal investigation as
an extension of scientific investigation, and often move from naturalist and externalist
stances in epistemology. It is not easy to map out all such proposals; but two main
strands in particular should be mentioned.
The first one continues to tie modal knowledge to our imaginative capacities, though
in a novel way, as deployed in counterfactual reasoning. In counterfactual supposition
aimed at gaining modal knowledge, quasi-perceptual imagining and off -line simu-
lation are often thought to play a crucial role (see e.g. Hill 2006; Williamson 2007;
Kroedel 2012; Vetter 2016). These proposals emerge within a larger context of increas-
ing interest in the study of all aspects of our imaginative capacities, and their cognitive
roles in particular (for a recent overview, see the essays in Kind and Kung 2016. See
also Balcerak Jackson 2018; Kind forthcoming). This literature fruitfully integrates
results from recent psychological studies on mental imagery, simulation, and pretence
(e.g. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Nichols and Stitch 2003; Kosslyn et al. 2006; Liao
and Gendler 2011) and on counterfactual reasoning (e.g. Byrne 2005); as well as
from the study of counterfactuals in linguistics (e.g. Kratzer 2012). Yet another line of
research explores the logic of imagination, by modeling our imaginative acts through
various original possible-world semantics (e.g. Berto 2017; Casas-Roma Huertas and
Rodríguez 2019).
On the other hand, some second-generation thinkers have inaugurated a whole new
approach to the issue of modal knowledge by introducing unconventional, empiri-
cal means and methods as legitimate candidates for explaining modal knowledge.
Empirical means were neglected in the discussion because of the (implicit or explicit)
assumption that modal knowledge, by its very nature or structurally, must proceed a
priori. (See Casullo 2003, 2010 for discussion of some traditional inferential princi-
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ples linking the epistemic and the modal—particularly the a priori and the necessary).
Such means and methods include inductive and abductive inference (Roca-Royes
2017; Nolan 2017; Leon 2017), the use of scientific theories and arguments (Fischer
2016; Bueno and Shalkowski 2014); empirical knowledge of dispositions and abilities
(Vetter 2015, 2016); and even perception (Hanrahan 2009; Legg 2012; Strohminger
2015; Legg and Franklin 2017). (For further proposals within this second-generation
empiricist wave, see the essays in Fischer and Leon 2017). In a different fashion,
Williamson 2013 has challenged the traditional distinction between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge by questioning its very significance. For Williamson, our cog-
nitive processes are not strictly empirical nor purely a priori according to traditional
standards (imagination is a main example), to the effect that the a priori/ a posteriori
categories do not “cut at the epistemological joints”. Epistemic justification is instead
best conceived as “armchair” and straddling our ordinary epistemological categories.
(For a recent discussion of the issue of a priori knowledge and justification, also in
connection to imagination and understanding, see Boghossian and Williamson forth-
coming).
A separate mention should also be given to various forms of conventionalism about
modality and modal knowledge that developed in parallel with the other two strands.
Conventionalists generally deny that our modal language describes real facts “out
there” in the world (or other possible worlds!) and offer alternative normative accounts
of the meaning and function of our modal expressions. Such non-descriptivist solu-
tions, they hold, simplify in turn the issue of modal knowledge (e.g. Sidelle 1989;
Sveinsdóttir 2008, 2013; Thomasson 2013, this volume, and forthcoming).
1.4 The third generation—current trends in modal epistemology
Moving on to the latest debates, we get to the third generation of thinkers. There
seem to be at least four main common lines of thought among those authors, which
are well represented in the present collection. (i) An endorsement of the importance
of essentialism; (ii) a tendency towards a “metaphysics-first” methodology; (iii) the
focus on metaphysical modality as opposed to other kinds of modality; (iv) a preference
toward non-uniformity.
Let us look at each of those in turn.
1.4.1 Essentialism
We are witnessing an explosion of interest in essentialism within metaphysics. This
neo-Aristotelian trend goes all the way back to the work of Kit Fine in the 1990s;
particularly, to his thesis that metaphysical necessities hold in virtue of the essence or
nature of things (Fine 1994). Fine’s “canonical reduction” of metaphysical necessity to
essence (as Teitel 2019 has called it) is the basis upon which third-generation thinkers
build out a variety of individual accounts. The appealing, common idea they pursue
is that, given the canonical reduction, modal knowledge can then be explained in a
straightforward way in terms of knowledge of essence. Of course, it is then a crucial
task to clarify what essences are and how we get to know them. Lowe (2008, 2012),
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Hale (2013), as well as arguably Kripke (1980), all put forward pioneering essential-
ist accounts of modal knowledge. The core, common idea is that modal knowledge
proceeds inferentially, on the basis of certain bridge-principles, from knowledge of
essence to knowledge of metaphysical necessity. Although there is a clear continuity
between those early accounts and more recent ones, third-generation thinkers advance
several original proposals, while addressing familiar criticisms against traditional
essentialism (e.g. Jago this volume; Hale this volume; Kment this volume; Mallozzi
2018, this volume; Tahko 2017, 2018; Vaidya and Wallner this volume). Importantly,
several third-generation essentialists (or “neo-essentialists”, as I shall call them) main-
tain a continuity with modal empiricists, as well, in that they understand knowledge
of metaphysical modality largely as an empirical matter. By drawing from Kripke’s
treatment of a posteriori necessities (1971, 1980), essences are held to be things that
we may discover empirically, often scientifically. Notably, while essentialist deduc-
tion is still widely regarded as the canonical epistemic route to modal knowledge,
certain “recombination strategies”, as we may call them, have also emerged. Those
strategies take elements that were originally distinctive of a particular modal episte-
mology (e.g. conceivability, or counterfactual reasoning) and recombine them with
the requirement that some knowledge of essence must be in place for gaining modal
knowledge. The resulting theories, while positively essentialist, look hybrid according
to traditional classifications (e.g. Goff this volume, who combines essentialism with
conceivability; Kment this volume, who combines essentialism with conceivability, as
well as counterfactual reasoning).2 Recombination strategies can be roughly located
within the broader recent tendency to pursue “non-uniformity” in modal epistemol-
ogy: see sect. (1.4.4.) below. (Specifically, recombination theories qualify as locally
non-uniform, because they hold that multiple mental operations or methods jointly
contribute to access truths within the same modal sub-field—in this case, the sub-field
of metaphysical modality).3
Further key issues on the neo-essentialist agenda, as we will see, include the causal
and non-causal roles of essential properties, and their distinctive tie with explanation;
the structure and epistemic fertility of natural kinds; the ontology of essence—par-
ticularly the abstract cases and how we might access them a priori; the connection
between essentialist laws and other metaphysical laws, as well as with the laws of
nature.
1.4.2 Ametaphysics-first approach to modal knowledge
Remarkably, many of the latest accounts turn away from the debates concerning the
epistemic means and methods involved with modal knowledge, which occupied the
previous two generations of thinkers. Instead, they take on the investigation of modal
knowledge by first examining what this knowledge depends on or how it is constrained.
This important methodological switch introduces what I have called a “metaphysics-
first” approach to modal epistemology (inspired by Devitt 2010). The main idea is that
2 Recombination strategies can also be non-essentialist. A recent example is Dorhn (2019), who joins
Yablo’s conceivability with analogic reasoning.
3 For a full taxonomy, see my “Non-Uniform Modal Epistemology”, ms.
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we should start our inquiry by first trying to get some grasp on the nature of modality
itself, as those metaphysical findings will be a helpful basis to answer the epistemolog-
ical questions. And the more we know about the nature of modality, the better we can
pursue and answer the epistemological questions. This is in a way a “return” to modal
metaphysics, as I suggest below (this volume). The (first- and second-generation)
epistemology of modality of the past two decades has been itself a response to the phi-
losophy of modality up to that point, which had focused on the logic, semantics, and
metaphysics of modality without much concern for the epistemology. Then, thanks
to the above-mentioned Yablo’s (1993) study of conceivability, van Inwagen’s (1998)
epistemological challenge, as well as the essays in Gendler and Hawthorne’s (2002)
anthology, the issue of modal knowledge came into full view. However, this theoreti-
cal correction in favor of epistemology in the long run lead to a neglect of discussing
the connection to modality itself—of its nature and scope—which now requires a
counterbalancing.
In his 1999 Peacocke stressed the importance of “providing, for any given area, a
simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology” (1). He called this difficult
theoretical task the “Integration Challenge”. The metaphysics-first methodology gives
us a promising guide to address the Integration Challenge, and to gain thereby a fuller
picture of a given area of inquiry. Generally speaking, how we should learn about X
depends on what X is; so, we need some grasp on what X is before addressing the
issue of how we know about X. This methodology encourages us to find out as much
as possible about the nature of the target entities of our epistemic questions, for the
nature of those entities constrains the relevant answers. Thus, in the case of modality,
we should have some grasp on what modality is or the nature of modal truth, in order
to address the issue of how we know about modality.
More or less explicitly, most authors in the present collection endorse this novel
approach in modal epistemology. Throughout the volume, we see a consistent effort
to get clearer about the modal metaphysics as a tool to access the epistemology; which
is exemplified by the discussion of core topics such as the nature, scope, and function
of the modal notions; the metaphysics of essence and essential properties; as well
as the regulative role that relations of grounding, principles of mereology, and the
metaphysical laws more generally might play for what is possible and necessary.
Peacocke (2019) also explicitly defends a metaphysics-first approach to issues in
semantics and epistemology. As he cashes it out, this is the thesis that (for a large
number of domains) the metaphysics of a domain is explanatorily prior or more fun-
damental than the ways we think about that domain (cf. similarly Devitt 1996: §4.12;
2010). Importantly, Peacocke points out how this explanatory priority of the meta-
physical domain might not always involve a corresponding priority in the context of
discovery. For we might find out about the epistemology (or semantics) of a domain
first, and only later learn about its metaphysics. Still, this in no way affects the explana-
tory priority of the metaphysical domain. While I agree with Peacocke’s point, I should
clarify that, as understood here, the metaphysics-first approach to modal epistemology
also concerns to an important extent a priority in the context of discovery. However,
this is a regulative not a descriptive aspect of the approach. Namely: granted that we do
sometimes find out about the epistemology of X prior to its metaphysics, we should
choose, as a general guideline and where possible, to start our investigation of the
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epistemology of X by first tackling the metaphysics of X. And the reason why we
should do so, as mentioned, is that our metaphysical findings about X will help us
account for how we know about X. The regulative thesis is thus itself supported by
the explanatory priority of the metaphysical domain.
1.4.3 Targeting metaphysical modality
Most recent accounts of modal knowledge specifically target metaphysical modality,
as opposed to other kinds of modality (e.g. logical modality, nomological modality,
etc.) This marks a departure from the previous generation, since most modal empiri-
cists tended to push knowledge of metaphysical modality into the background, while
focusing on knowledge of ordinary practical, nomic, and dispositional modalities
(e.g. Roca-Royes 2017; Strohminger 2015; Vetter 2016). A main concern of modal
empiricism was that focusing on metaphysical modality would make us overlook our
knowledge of ordinary modal claims, as well as misguide us into believing that modal
knowledge must proceed a priori. Echoing van Inwagen’s (1998) distinction between
everyday vs. remote modal knowledge, modal empiricists proposed that our episte-
mological inquiry focus on the former, apparently more accessible cases, and engage
with knowledge of “remote” metaphysical scenarios derivatively, often in connection
to the broader study of philosophical methodology.4
It is certainly a non-trivial task to define what exactly metaphysical modality picks
out, especially compared to the other modalities, on which we seem to have a bet-
ter grip. Still, this should not throw us into skepticism. In fact, there is a lot that we
can say to clarify this notion, as well as promising directions to advance our under-
standing going forward (though see Priest this volume for an opposite view). First of
all, we should distinguish metaphysical modality from various types of non-alethic
deontic and epistemic modalities (i.e., those modalities concerned with the ‘can’ and
‘ought’ of moral, practical, and epistemic permission and obligation). On the other
hand, we should also distinguish it from other alethic modalities like logical modality
(which roughly is governed by the axioms of logic and basic truth-preserving patterns
of inference), or physical-nomological modality (which roughly is governed by the
actual laws of nature). Moving on to a more positive characterization of metaphysical
modality, there is seemingly a distinctive way in which this has to do with the nature
of things, and with how reality in its most general traits could and must have been.
Philosophers working within different traditions such as those of Kripke, Lewis, Fine,
as well as Williamson, will likely find the broad talk of the nature of things and the
most general traits of reality equally congenial (in fact it is common to introduce
metaphysical possibility and necessity simply in terms of ways things might have
been, and must have been respectively). Of course, we can then further specify this
neutral characterization by adding various theoretical commitments. As noted, there
is a widespread tendency in the current literature to elucidate metaphysical modality
by delving into such notions as essence, metaphysical laws, and grounding and mere-
ological relations. And while no commitment to any such notion is strictly required
4 van Inwagen is skeptical that remote modal knowledge is within our reach. On the other hand, he does
not explicitly locate metaphysical modality within that area.
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for meaningful metaphysical modal talk, their investigation does seem to give us a
deeper understanding of what metaphysical modality is about.
On the other hand, it is also somewhat usual in the literature to characterize meta-
physical modality in terms of absolute, or the strongest, or the widest modality,
probably following allusive remarks in Kripke (1980), as well as Lewis (1986). This
is not uncommon even among essentialists: Hale for example describes metaphysical
necessity as “absolute” in the sense of “what holds true absolutely unconditionally,
or ‘come what may’” (2013: 99. See also Fine 2002; Kment 2014; Lowe 2012).
Although perhaps fascinating, those glosses do not seem especially insightful to help
us understand the distinctive subject matter of metaphysical modality. In fact, they are
potentially misleading, since arguably they capture quite squarely logical modality.
Briefly, note that logical necessities plausibly include the fundamental laws of logic
and truth-preserving patterns of inference, as well as their instances. Their modal
force is commonly partly attributed to their having a certain form, namely generality,
which grants them in turn a special inferential status. (As McFetridge put it, logical
necessity is absolute, and the strongest, in the sense that we are prepared to deploy a
logically necessary proposition as a premise in reasoning over the unrestricted range,
from any supposition whatsoever. McFetridge 1990: 153–154. See also Divers and
Elstein 2012; Divers and González-Varela 2013). Logical necessities seem in effect
ideal candidates for the “strongest” or “widest” necessities or necessities “come what
may” (even for Quine, logical necessities are the last ones we would give up). Logical
possibilities, in turn, are only minimally constrained in terms of coherence. Simplify-
ing a bit, just about anything is logically possible as long as it does not violate (at least)
the principle of noncontradiction.5 Thus, logical possibility seems an ideal candidate
for “absolute” or the “widest” possibility. By contrast, metaphysical modality strikes
us as quite restricted and qualified—at the very least, as more restricted and quali-
fied than logical modality. Think of traditional examples. Scenarios where, say, Saul
Kripke is Rudolph Carnap’s son, or where iron has atomic number 25 (it is actually
26!) are not genuine metaphysical possibilities (or at least so most metaphysicians
believe). Still, they are coherent, in the sense that there is no contradiction in merely
supposing that they hold, while setting aside metaphysical axioms in conjunction
with certain truths about the actual world. Vice-versa, the fact that Saul Kripke must
have had the parents he actually has, or that iron’s atomic number must have been 26,
while certainly necessary, are far from being “absolute”, “unconditional”, and the like.
Fairly precise conditions have to be in place instead. The relevant—possible and actu-
al—worlds must have a certain nomological and metaphysical profile and, arguably,
certain essentialist laws must hold. These quick considerations are not meant to show
that logical modality is absolute (or any of the other properties I mentioned). Still, they
should suffice to see that it might be hard to draw a line between metaphysical modal-
ity and logical modality given the above characterization. (Similarly Clarke-Doane
this volume; van Inwagen 1998: 82, fn.9). Analogous remarks apply to Williamson’s
recent definition of metaphysical modality in terms of the broadest objective modal-
ity (2016; see also Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri 2017). Moreover, it is worth noting
5 Logical pluralists might want to be even more concessive and expand the range of possibilities to those
that do not violate the logical rules that are set by the logic in question. (Thanks to Anand Vaidya for
pointing this out).
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that Williamson operates with a technical notion of objectivity (as opposed to a more
ordinary understanding of being “mind-independent” or otherwise “non-subjective”),
which he draws from linguistics. “Objective” for him captures the property we might
call of referential transparency, namely, the property of a sentence of “not [being] sen-
sitive to the guises under which the objects, properties, relations and states of affairs
at issue are presented” (2016: 454). Although objectivity qua referential transparency
might help us draw a clearer line between logical modality and metaphysical modal-
ity, it also seems in need of further motivation. Additionally, Williamsons’ approach
has the disadvantage that it does not tell us about the content or subject matter of
metaphysical modality—what those truths are about—but it only highlights a formal
property of modal sentences. All in all, understanding metaphysical modality in terms
of the nature of things and how reality in its most general traits could and must have
been seems to better capture the distinctive, rich content of metaphysical possibility
and necessity, and to indicate fruitful paths for further investigation. That is why I
adopt it and recommend it over those other characterizations.
1.4.4 Non-uniformmodal epistemology
A further thesis has been gaining attention in the latest debates, which I call “epistemic
non-uniformity”. This is a thesis concerning the architecture of modal epistemology.
Claiming that modal epistemology is non-uniform means that knowledge of possibility
and necessity need not proceed via one single epistemic route. Instead, multiple means
and methods may be required for modal knowledge. Depending on the cases, we
might need, for example, essentialist deduction, or conceivability, or counterfactual
reasoning, in order to access possibility and necessity. Explaining such variations
in means and methods for accessing modal truth, or in sources of justification, is
not easy of course. Those seem to rest themselves on multiple factors, both subject-
dependent (e.g., different people might use different routes to acquire the same bit of
modal knowledge), and subject-independent (e.g. we might need different epistemic
routes depending on the type of modal truths we are looking at: logical, metaphysical,
dispositional, etc. But also depending on the circumstances at stake: perhaps the same
subject might come to know the same modal truth through different routes, depending
on the specific epistemic context she is in). As of now (July 2019), epistemic non-
uniformity has not yet been directly discussed or worked out as a theory in print. But
many think that this is the direction we should pursue (see Roca-Royes forthcoming;
Mallozzi ms. cit. for developments). Importantly, pursuing non-uniformity represents
a point of departure from the traditional literature, both historical and first-generation,
which mostly aimed to give a single unified account of our knowledge of possibility
and necessity (at least within the domain of metaphysical modality). Also notably, we
can find gestures at non-uniformity already among second-generation thinkers (e.g.
Fischer 2017; Leon 2017; Roca-Royes 2017, 2018; Strohminger 2015; Tahko 2017;
Vaidya 2017). A further element of continuity with the previous generation is (in
most cases) an empiricist approach to modal issues. But, in line with epistemic non-
uniformity, the general atmosphere is one where modal epistemologists seem open to
a whole variety of epistemic routes contributing to our access to modal truths, both
empirical and a priori.
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2 Part II
Here is an outline of the four chapters of this special issue.
In Chapter (1), we find a few papers that discuss skeptical challenges and kinds of
deflationism about modal knowledge. Some of them target directly our knowledge of
modality as a whole (Wang; Vaidya and Wallner), or specific cases of it (Jackson).
Others target certain modal notions themselves, with potential consequences for the
epistemology (Clarke-Doane; Priest). Accordingly, I labeled the latter “metaphysical
challenges” and the former “epistemological challenges”. Vaidya and Wallner further
suggest that we can push back serious epistemological challenges by appealing to
essence. So, next we move on to some positive proposals, starting with essentialism.
Chapter (2) collects several accounts of modal knowledge as based on knowledge
of essence. Hale, Jago, Kment, and Mallozzi all build their epistemological theories
on the metaphysical assumption that metaphysical necessity depends on essence (the
Finean “canonical reduction” mentioned above). Kment and Mallozzi take a largely
empirical route; while Hale looks at specific cases of a priori knowledge of essence.
Goff brings together essentialist knowledge and conceivability in a rationalist fashion.
Chapter (3) includes several non-essentialist theories of modal knowledge. Biggs
and Wilson appeal to a novel notion of a priori abduction, especially against
conceivability-accounts; Thomasson lays out a normativist account that ties modal-
ity and modal knowledge to our use of language and the rules that govern it. Berto
explores the epistemic powers of imagination more generally, with potential gains for
modal knowledge in particular.
Finally, in chapter (4), Rabin criticizes a familiar rationalist method of using a priori
entailment as a tool to reject physicalism.
Let us now turn to briefly present the individual papers in this special issue.
2.1 Chapter 1: skepticism and deflationism
2.1.1 Metaphysical challenges
In his essay, Metaphysical and Absolute Possibility, Justin Clarke-Doane examines the
thesis that metaphysical possibility is “absolute”. Whereas this thesis seems “widely
alleged” in the literature, for Clarke-Doane it is “a mere article of faith”. More precisely,
Clarke-Doane criticizes the idea that metaphysical modality, as distinct from both
epistemic (doxastic) and deontic modality, is modality in the “broadest objective” and
“unrestricted” sense. Along similar lines to those I presented in (1.4.3.) above, Clarke-
Doane points out that logical possibility, while distinct from epistemic and deontic
notions, is still “dramatically more inclusive” than metaphysical possibility (especially
when the logic in question includes contingent identity). For, many scenarios that seem
to us metaphysically impossible are perfectly logically possible. Thereby, the notion of
metaphysical modality is not suited to capture how the world could have been different
in the most inclusive sense. Importantly, however, that metaphysical possibility is a
restricted notion of possibility does not mean for him that it is uninteresting, or that
it fails to “carve at the joints”. Clarke-Doane concludes that metaphysical necessity
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is to absolute necessity what restricted notions of set are to the full iterative notion.
Consequently, modal metaphysics should not be centered on it.
In Metaphysical Necessity: A Skeptical Perspective, Graham Priest questions the
established view that there is a distinctive notion of metaphysical necessity—namely,
one that is distinct from other notions of necessity, and in particular from analytic
necessity and physical necessity. Priest mainly criticizes Kripke’s (1980) views, by
pointing out that they rest on two sorts of considerations. First, what Priest calls ‘intu-
ition pumps’, namely thought experiments that do not strictly provide arguments.
And, second, an argument for the (metaphysical) necessity of identities, which pecu-
liarly appeals to the substitutivity of identicals (SI). Priest proceeds, first, to “pump
intuitions” the other way, aiming to elicit a sort of “skeptical epoché” in the reader.
Second, he challenges Kripke’s argument. Against this, Priest argues that (SI) fails in a
number of contexts, e.g. intentional and modal contexts. Moreover, (SI) fails in modal
contexts when we assume a system of contingent identity. Why should one be entitled
to assume the logic of necessary identity rather than contingent identity? Relying on
(SI) is thus for Priest to beg the question in favor of metaphysical necessity, rather
than to provide an argument.
2.1.2 Epistemological challenges
In her short piece, The Epistemological Challenge to Modal Primitivism, Jennifer
Wang aims to show that the epistemological objection that we cannot know modal
truths perceptually or via causal connection is wide-ranging. As Wang argues, this
objection applies to all forms of realism about modality across the board. Namely, it
applies both to reductionist accounts, which roughly hold that modal facts or properties
can be reduced to other, non-modal entities (e.g. Lewis’ realism, various sorts of
combinatorialism, etc.); and to primitivist accounts, which hold instead that modal
entities are primitive or not further reducible (e.g. modalism, essentialism, etc.). As
a consequence, Wang concludes, the debate between reductionism and primitivism
does not bear on modal epistemology. If the epistemological challenge “can be met
by the reductionist via some extant epistemology of modality, it can be met by the
primitivist in the same way”.
Frank Jackson’s essay, Deflationism about the Necessary A Posteriori and Twin
Earth, defines deflationism about an example of a necessary a posteriori truth as the
view that discovering that it is a necessary truth—that it is true throughout modal
space—is not a discovery about the membership of modal space; it is nothing more
than a discovery about the actual world. He calls such discoveries “Cambridge” dis-
coveries about modal space. ‘Actually there are electrons’ is an example: all it took
to learn that this sentence is necessarily true was something about the actual world.
Jackson holds that if names can be treated as simple rigidified descriptions, the same
is true for examples of the necessary a posteriori like ‘Necessarily, anything that is
Hesperus is Phosphorus’. He argues, however, using Twin-Earth style considerations,
that many names cannot be handled in this way. Crucially, the sort of Twin-Earth con-
siderations Jackson appeals to are not the traditional externalist ones. He claims that
“the important message of Twin Earth has been widely misunderstood”. Instead, Jack-
son sketches an alternative deflationist strategy for handling cases of the necessary a
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posteriori containing names that cannot be treated as simple rigidified descriptions.
According to him, such cases involve de se names, which crucially partly rely on
the role of producers in determining what/whom the name refers to.
In The Epistemology of Modality and The Problem of Modal Epistemic Fric-
tion, Anand Vaidya and Michael Wallner point out that the three main theories of
modal knowledge of the past 20 years— namely, conceivability-theory, counterfac-
tual-theory, and deduction-theory—suffer from a common problem. In order for our
conceivability, imaginative, and deductive exercises to lead to modal knowledge, they
need to be adequately constrained—i.e., something must produce a sort of “epistemic
friction” on those exercises, so that they do not lead us astray. Furthermore, Vaidya and
Wallner argue that the relevant constraints are essentialist propositions or principles.
For each theory, they illustrate in detail how our exercises aimed at gaining modal
knowledge are only successful when they do not violate the nature of things at stake.
Thus, in different ways, all major accounts of modal knowledge rest on facts about
essence. If that is correct, the question of how we know about essences turns out to
be crucial for modal epistemology, as we must integrate an epistemology of essence
in order to fully explain modal knowledge. While addressing that question is beyond
the scope of Vaidya and Wallner’s paper, that constitutes a nice bridging-point with
the papers in the following chapter, which develop several essentialist routes to modal
knowledge.
2.2 Chapter 2: essentialism
In Putting Modal Metaphysics First, Antonella Mallozzi aims to clarify knowledge of
metaphysical modality starting from the metaphysics of essence. According to Mal-
lozzi, essences have distinctive explanatory powers for how things are—in fact, they
are superexplanatory. Mallozzi focuses on examples involving kinds and illustrates
how essences are best understood in terms of underlying cores which typically cause
and explain many properties and behaviors that consistently co-occur in the instances
of such kinds. This helps clarify in what sense essences are held to constitute the
“nature” of things. Accordingly, against longstanding criticisms of being mysterious
entities and the relic of a pre-scientific era, essences are instead things that we discover
empirically, typically via scientific investigation. According to Mallozzi, we may thus
have a key to the epistemology of central cases of metaphysical necessity. By building
into the account a Kripkean bridge-principle connecting essence and necessity (‘If
X is essentially F, then necessarily X is F’), Mallozzi holds that modal knowledge
proceeds inferentially, from premises concerning the actual makeup of the world to
conclusions about the non-actual and necessary. We infer what is necessarily true of
things from our knowledge of what is essential to things, in the sense of playing such
core causal-explanatory roles.
In Essence and Modal Knowledge, Boris Kment develops an account of modal
knowledge that builds off his own modal metaphysics (2014). It is a central tenet
of Kment’s framework that modal properties are defined in terms of metaphysical
laws, where the notion of a metaphysical law is a generalization of the concept of an
essential truth. Thereby, much of our modal knowledge for Kment crucially depends
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on knowledge of the metaphysical laws, including essential truths. He discusses two
ways in which we might acquire knowledge of such laws. (1) Abductively, via inference
to the best explanation; for essential truths, and metaphysical laws more generally,
play a crucial role in causal and grounding explanations. And (2), by relying on our
conceptual or linguistic competence; for competence with a term often requires (at
least implicit) knowledge of part or all of the real definition of the thing picked out by
the term, and for Kment real definitions are a type of essential truth. For example, to be
competent with modal notions, you need to know (at least implicitly) that modality is
essentially connected to the metaphysical laws. This knowledge, when combined with
other information about the metaphysical laws gained by routes (1) and (2), allows
you to acquire modal knowledge “in a variety of different ways.” For instance, you
can establish the metaphysical possibility of P by conceiving of a scenario in which P
holds—a process that often makes crucial use of counterfactual reasoning.
Mark Jago’s Knowing How Things Might Have Been also offers an account of
modal knowledge that moves from the canonical reduction of metaphysical necessity
to essence. Jago rejects both conceivability-based and counterfactual-based accounts
and holds instead that we can explain our knowledge of metaphysical modality by way
of our (implicit or explicit) knowledge of essence. Like others, Jago aims to refute
longstanding skepticism against essences; to do so, he lays out a metaphysical account
according to which essences are simply bundles of located properties. Moreover,
for Jago we can refer and single out these bundles straightforwardly, in thought or
language, by conceptualizing them under kinds. Knowledge of essence is thus secured
by a reliable connection with reality, which is due in part to the way we think about
objects and forms beliefs about them. Knowledge of essence, in turn, leads us to
knowledge of necessity and possibility via a conceptual connection between essence
and necessity. For Jago, “it is a conceptual truth that whatever is essentially F is
necessarily F”; thereby, possessing the concepts of ‘essence’ and ‘necessity’, together
with the relevant essentialist knowledge jointly results in knowledge of necessity.
Essence and Definition by Abstraction by Bob Hale, to whose memory this volume
is dedicated, discusses an apparent tension between definition by abstraction and real
definition, for the case of numbers. Hume’s Principle defines the number operator by
means of definition by abstraction, which means (at least according to neo-Fregeans)
that the definition is partly stipulative and implicit. This seems to clash with the familiar
Aristotelian conception of real definition as capturing the essence of the thing. Hale
offers a way out, which reconciles neo-Fregean implicit definitions with essentialism.
In certain cases, like the one of numbers at stake, definition by abstraction gives us a
priori access to the essence of the entity that is being defined. As he puts it, “on the
basis of these definitions one can gain knowledge a priori of the nature of cardinal and
natural numbers.” Hale further clarifies that there is no “happy coincidence” between
the definition of the word and the essence of the thing; let alone that numbers somehow
depend on us for their existence. “Definition by abstraction creates no objects. What,
if successful, it creates is only a concept”. Otherwise put, while we fix the meaning
of a word by defining it so-and-so, that there exists a property of being so-and-so is
entirely independent of any such definition.
In his short piece, Essentialist Modal Rationalism, Philip Goff aims to refine the
picture of modal knowledge he sketched in his recent book (2017), to avoid cer-
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tain counterexamples and secure a general account. Goff puts forward a kind of
conceivability-based rationalism that is consistent with the Kripke-Putnam cases
by integrating essentialist knowledge. More specifically, for Goff rational coherence
entails possibility when one grasps the essential nature of what she is conceiving
of. However, it seems that there might be propositions that are possible even though
we cannot grasp the nature of the entities they involve. This may be because those
very entities are ‘brute one offs’, namely they lack a defining nature. To address these
sorts of counterexamples, Goff clarifies that coherent conceiving and possibility go
together when one grasps the full reality of what is being conceived, which may involve
in particular grasping information concerning the entities’ identity.
2.3 Chapter 3: non-essentialist accounts
2.3.1 Imagination
Francesco Berto’s Taming the runabout imagination ticket defends our imaginative
exercises against the charge of being merely arbitrary and therefore lacking epistemic
power. Specifically, Berto singles out a kind of reality-oriented mental simulation and
provides a formal semantics to model its central features. Imagination thus understood
is similar to a kind of subjunctive thinking, and leads us to gain newly formed condi-
tional beliefs, similar to a kind of “simulated belief revision”. Although Berto does not
address the issue of modal knowledge directly, his account shows how imagination
is tied to modal thinking, as well as how it can have epistemic value for knowledge
of counterfactuals. Thus, if successful, Berto’s proposal both answers an epistemic
challenge and sets the ground for developing a novel account of modal knowledge
based on imagination.
2.3.2 Abduction
In Abduction vs. Conceiving in Modal Epistemology, Stephen Biggs and Jessica Wilson
compare abduction-based vs. conceiving-based modal epistemologies and argue in
favor of the former. Crucially, Biggs and Wilson put forward a new conception of
abduction (or inference to the best explanation) as a priori, rejecting what they see as
the “widespread but mistaken assumption that abduction is an a posteriori mode of
inference”. They first argue that the view that abduction is a priori has historical precur-
sors, in Kant’s notion of the synthetic a priori and Carnap’s notion of explication. They
then argue that the common assumption that abduction is a posteriori is mistaken in
failing to appreciate that abductive principles are prescriptions for choosing between,
not descriptions of, theories, and relatedly, that the ceteris paribus clauses associ-
ated with abductive principles shield them from empirical disconfirmation. Biggs and
Wilson go on to argue that there are three main advantages of an abduction-based
account of modal knowledge, so understood, over a conceiving-based account. First,
an abduction-based account does better by way of overcoming modal indeterminacy
and skepticism, thanks to its ampliative resources. Second, an abduction-based account
does better by way of legislating between competing or incompatible dispositions
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to apply concepts, since abduction allows different theories of such dispositions to
be compared and ranked, based on considerations of, among other things, relative
explanatory power. And third, an abduction-based account better accommodates sub-
stantive philosophical disagreement about modal claims in such a way as to advance
the dialectic, by measuring the explanatory costs of the parties’ respective beliefs.
2.3.3 Normativism
In How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths? Amie Thomasson devel-
ops a normativist account of modality and modal knowledge, based on our use of
language and the semantic rules that govern it. Thomasson argues that recent empiri-
cist theories of modal knowledge are unable to solve the problem of how we can
know specifically metaphysical modal truths. Treatments of modal discourse typi-
cally rely on the descriptivist assumption that our metaphysical modal claims track or
describe certain features of our world, or other (possible) worlds. As a consequence,
modal claims require (this or other-) worldly truthmakers, which causes several noto-
rious epistemological problems. Thomasson rejects the descriptivist assumption and
argues that doing so makes these classic epistemological problems show up very dif-
ferently. The remaining versions of the epistemological problems, she argues, the
modal normativist is well-positioned to solve. For her, modal knowledge is a matter
of being able to explicitly convey the semantic rules that we implicitly master as com-
petent speakers of our language. Accordingly, knowledge of metaphysical modality
for Thomasson involves three elements specifically. First, mastering semantic rules
and making them explicit. Second, a certain amount of empirical knowledge. And
third, reasoning abilities. For Thomasson, normativism so understood further offers
an evolutionary explanation of why we modalize as we do, since natural selection
might have plausibly favored those capable of such activities.
2.4 Chapter 4. Applications: conceivability and themind–body problem
In Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Scrutability Argument
Against Physicalism, Gabriel Rabin criticizes a familiar rationalist method of using
a priori entailment as a tool to reject physicalism. Such arguments use modal ratio-
nalism, according to which “there are important, potentially constitutive, connections
between a priori justification and metaphysical modality” to support the inference from
an epistemic to a metaphysical gap between the physical and the mental. Rabin argues
that this use of modal rationalism depends on a particular ambitious implementation
of the rationalist program, which should be rejected on independent grounds. Rabin’s
argument belongs to the broad camp of the so-called phenomenal concept strategies,
which locate the explanatory gap between the physical and consciousness in certain
features of our representations for conscious experience, rather than in a metaphysical
gap resulting from dualism. Specifically, Rabin’s argument rests on a meta-semantic
framework of reference-determination where terms get their meaning in large part
by demonstrative use. According to Rabin, there is a fundamental “vital connection”
between our phenomenal concepts and terms and demonstratives. Because of that, the
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physical truths alone, without the demonstrative truths, cannot entail a priori truths
about consciousness. As a result, the a priori entailment from a demonstrative-less base
fails. However, Rabin believes that integrating demonstrative truths into the entailment
base offers a way to reconcile physicalism with a moderate kind of rationalism.
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